Security

Fri, Oct 307 papers

arXiv

Measuring Duplication, Leakage, and Rendering Dependence in Malware-as-Image Benchmarks

Stefan Larson, Kevin Leach

Classifying malware binaries rendered as images is a popular approach to malware family identification, and papers on the standard benchmarks for this task report…Classifying malware binaries rendered as images is a popular approach to malware family identification, and papers on the standard benchmarks for this task report accuracies of 97-99%.

Duplicate pairs found by the audit, one benchmark per column.
Preprint: empirical study
arXiv

Provably Secure Diffusion Watermarking Against Removal Adversaries with Batched Detector Access

De Zhang Lee, Ee-Chien Chang

Recent latent-based watermarking methods can embed undetectable watermarks into AI-generated content. However, these approaches are vulnerable to removal attacks as their…Recent latent-based watermarking methods can embed undetectable watermarks into AI-generated content. However, these approaches are vulnerable to removal attacks as their watermark detection boundaries are exposed, prompting the…

Preprint: method
arXiv

CARI: Cross-Boundary Adversarial Runtime Injection in Coding-Agent Workflows

Jie Fu, Shuang Wu, Ashish Kundu et al.

Coding agents increasingly develop, test, and integrate software whose components are owned by different developers, teams, or services.Coding agents increasingly develop, test, and integrate software whose components are owned by different developers, teams, or services. This exposes a distinct attack surface: a malicious or compromised peer development role can…

Overview of CARI. A compromised peer-controlled component injects malicious instructions through live runtime feedback, which can reach coding agents used by different development roles and induce…
Preprint: method
arXiv

Complexity of Differentially Private Selection via Federated APIs

Hilal Asi, Vitaly Feldman, Jelani Nelson et al.

Differential privacy (DP) has become the standard for privacy-preserving data analysis, yet its practical implementation in federated or distributed settings often faces…Differential privacy (DP) has become the standard for privacy-preserving data analysis, yet its practical implementation in federated or distributed settings often faces a significant utility gap compared to the central model.

Preprint: theory
arXiv

Poisoned training data made AI agents run malicious commands

The largest model executed malicious commands in roughly 92% of triggered tests after attackers poisoned 0.1% of its initial training data.The largest model executed malicious commands in roughly 92% of triggered tests after attackers poisoned 0.1% of its initial training data.

An outside attacker poisons a small fraction of the pretraining corpus.
Preprint: method
arXiv

FVH-Bench: Evaluating Image Generator Safety Beyond Overtly Harmful Imagery

Zihao Zhu, Yuhan Liu, Siwei Lyu et al.

Modern image generators can produce complex visual artifacts, including diagrams, interfaces, and records that combine text, graphics, and layout to convey detailed…Modern image generators can produce complex visual artifacts, including diagrams, interfaces, and records that combine text, graphics, and layout to convey detailed information.

An example of functional visual harm and an overview of FVH-Bench.
Preprint: benchmark or dataset

Wed, Oct 286 papers

arXiv

Penny for Your Prompts: A Measurement Study of Contextual Leakage in AI Chat Platforms

Paschalis Bekos, Billy Tsouvalas, Nick Nikiforakis et al.

AI chatbot platforms have become one of the most popular web interfaces users interact with online, routinely receiving personal and intimate information shared under an…AI chatbot platforms have become one of the most popular web interfaces users interact with online, routinely receiving personal and intimate information shared under an expectation of privacy.

Preprint: empirical study
arXiv

SecDMP: Provably Secure Data Memory-Dependent Prefetching (Extended Version)

Jens Sprengers, Marton Bognar, Lesly-Ann Daniel et al.

Data memory-dependent prefetchers (DMPs) are a microarchitectural optimization recently introduced in mainstream desktop and server CPUs.Data memory-dependent prefetchers (DMPs) are a microarchitectural optimization recently introduced in mainstream desktop and server CPUs. Although DMPs offer performance improvements, they have been shown to enable side-channel…

Preprint: system
arXiv

Watermark Basins: Black-Box Detection of Distilled LLMs

Hongyan Chang, Hady Elsahar, Tom Sander et al.

Proprietary language models and their reasoning traces are vulnerable to API-based distillation, where an adversary trains a student model on the teacher model's outputs.Proprietary language models and their reasoning traces are vulnerable to API-based distillation, where an adversary trains a student model on the teacher model's outputs.

The watermark basin. Training on watermarked traces moves the student into a persistent, key-specific watermark basin, whereas clean traces from the same teacher move it only along the task direction.
Preprint: method
arXiv

Blindfold: Keeping the Audit Coin Secret from LLM Agents

Wei Zhu, Meiyun Zuo, Huiping Sun

Audit-based certification bounds the violation rate of an LLM agent by auditing a random fraction ε of actions and reweighting the audited labels; its validity is meant…Audit-based certification bounds the violation rate of an LLM agent by auditing a random fraction ε of actions and reweighting the audited labels; its validity is meant to rest only on the defender's audit coin.

Preprint: theory
arXiv

I-HITL: Inalienable Human-in-the-Loop

Samuel Breckenridge, Dani Vilardell, Wenhao Wang et al.

Human oversight is a pillar of AI safety. It is often exercised by a human in the loop (HITL) who approves critical actions taken by an AI agent.Human oversight is a pillar of AI safety. It is often exercised by a human in the loop (HITL) who approves critical actions taken by an AI agent.

Two HITL configurations.
Preprint: system
arXiv

The Agent in the Middle: How AI-Mediated Access Reshapes Web Vulnerability Exploitation

Ruozhao Yang, Jiongchi Yu, Ming Hu et al.

Web services increasingly expose backend interfaces that let users delegate tasks to AI agents, which invoke service operations directly without navigating websites.Web services increasingly expose backend interfaces that let users delegate tasks to AI agents, which invoke service operations directly without navigating websites.

Overview of Vela. The two branches join only after the interface is frozen.Native exploit validation and construction of agent-facing interfaces proceed independently.
Preprint: benchmark or dataset

Tue, Oct 276 papers

arXiv

LLM WikiLeaks: Uncovering URL-Based Capability Extension and Security Circumvention in Agentic Message Boards

Orel Navi, Elad Feldman, Ben Nassi

Autonomous agents have been observed acting beyond their assigned tasks, accessing unauthorized systems, and establishing communication channels to exchange information…Autonomous agents have been observed acting beyond their assigned tasks, accessing unauthorized systems, and establishing communication channels to exchange information, yet the Web and network-level techniques they use to extend…

Examples of (a) Markdown conversion, which strips a page down to its text, (b) JSON filtering, which returns only the requested part of a document, and (c) OCR, which returns the text of an image…
Preprint: empirical study
arXiv

CyberDual: AI Attackers versus AI Code Reviewers in Real Software Maintenance

Chenyuan Yang, Hwiwon Lee, Jongseong Kim et al.

Open-source projects now let AI agents review incoming code, but the code under review may itself come from an AI attacker.Open-source projects now let AI agents review incoming code, but the code under review may itself come from an AI attacker. We present CyberDual, an arena for this dual role of AI: attacker agents hide an exploitable bug in real…

Attack collection, attack success rate and catch rate for every attacker and reviewer, by setup (Equation 2).
Preprint: benchmark or dataset
arXiv

NameTrap: Steering AI Coding Agents Toward Security Vulnerabilities via Variable Names

Chieh-Yuan Chang, Guan-Wei Chen, Chia-Yi Hsu et al.

AI coding agents routinely clone repositories, install packages, and read source code obtained from the Web, so publicly hosted code becomes part of the context that…AI coding agents routinely clone repositories, install packages, and read source code obtained from the Web, so publicly hosted code becomes part of the context that shapes the code they write.

Overview of NameTrap bait construction.
Preprint: method
arXiv

Filters against poisoned text relied on benchmark shortcuts

The RAGuard document filter’s miss rate rose from 0.191 to 0.763 after researchers removed prepended questions from the attack authors’ poisoned passages.The RAGuard document filter’s miss rate rose from 0.191 to 0.763 after researchers removed prepended questions from the attack authors’ poisoned passages.

A document filter holds back tabbed passages while a larger pile of black-marked passages without tabs spills past it, with removed tabs nearby.
Preprint: empirical study
arXiv

Ring-0 by Default: Agents as Operating Systems (AaOS)

Xiang Li, Aichun Huang, Zuyao Xu et al.

LLM agents now read and write files, start processes and subagents, fetch network content, load third-party extensions, and save and resume state, which are the…LLM agents now read and write files, start processes and subagents, fetch network content, load third-party extensions, and save and resume state, which are the responsibilities of an operating system.

Verdicts per subsystem ( SS ) A to S (over all 116 mechanisms); a star marks novel mechanisms.
Preprint: empirical study
arXiv

Who Verifies the Verifiers? Accountable Semantic Consensus for AI-Mediated Web Information Verification

Yanna Jiang, Mingyuan Li, Xu Wang et al.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly decide whether Web evidence supports online claims, often by voting over several assessors whose errors are presumed independent…Large language models (LLMs) increasingly decide whether Web evidence supports online claims, often by voting over several assessors whose errors are presumed independent and benign.

Preprint: method

Mon, Oct 265 papers

arXiv

TRACE: Data-Free Text Reconstruction Attacks against Approximate Unlearning in LLMs

Mengying Zhang, Derui Wang, Ibrahim Khalil et al.

As large language models (LLMs) face growing demands for data removal driven by regulatory compliance, copyright concerns, and privacy protection, approximate unlearning…As large language models (LLMs) face growing demands for data removal driven by regulatory compliance, copyright concerns, and privacy protection, approximate unlearning has emerged as a practical alternative to expensive full…

Preprint: method
arXiv

SILMARILS-MV: Information-Theoretically Secure Multi-Verifier Signatures with Dealer-Free Key Issuance and Linear Aggregation for Permissioned Blockchains

Khadijeh Bagheri, Hassan Khodaiemehr, Chen Feng

Permissioned blockchains authenticate transactions, votes and quorum certificates with computationally secure signatures, and post-quantum replacements inflate consensus…Permissioned blockchains authenticate transactions, votes and quorum certificates with computationally secure signatures, and post-quantum replacements inflate consensus traffic by orders of magnitude.

Preprint: method
arXiv

Omni-UBench: Benchmarking Omni-Modal LLM-based Guardrails Across Safety, Utility, and Reliability

Junhao Wang, Yidou Chen, Li Lu et al.

Advances in Omni-modal Large Language Models (OLLMs) have enabled increasingly seamless human-AI interaction, but their unified processing of heterogeneous modalities…Advances in Omni-modal Large Language Models (OLLMs) have enabled increasingly seamless human-AI interaction, but their unified processing of heterogeneous modalities also expands the attack surface, allowing adversaries to…

Overview of Omni-UBench.
Preprint: benchmark or dataset
arXiv

Fooling LLM Safety Guards into Judging the Wrong Text

Utkarsh Kanwat

Safety guards check content before an LLM application acts on it, and most paste that content into a plain-text prompt.Safety guards check content before an LLM application acts on it, and most paste that content into a plain-text prompt. Content that imitates the prompt can append a second task, and the guard answers that one instead.

Preprint: empirical study

Fri, Oct 237 papers

arXiv

AfterDeleteBench: Auditing Post-Deletion Information Persistence in LLM Agents

Ehsan Saleh, Roozbeh Nahavandi, Sama Salarian et al.

Many LLM agents maintain external persistent memory and derive additional state from past interactions, such as summaries.Many LLM agents maintain external persistent memory and derive additional state from past interactions, such as summaries. Deleting an original memory record therefore need not remove information carried by its descendants.

Preprint: benchmark or dataset
arXiv

Practical Auditing of Differentially Private Graph Release Mechanisms: Methodology, Toolkit, and Case Study

Nicholas D'Silva, Surya Nepal, Salil S. Kanhere

Differential Privacy (DP) has become a prominent approach for protecting graph data releases, yet empirical auditing methodologies have largely been developed for tabular…Differential Privacy (DP) has become a prominent approach for protecting graph data releases, yet empirical auditing methodologies have largely been developed for tabular datasets and machine learning pipelines rather than…

Preprint: method
arXiv

Structural cryptanalysis of classic McEliece: Assessment of claims, costs and evidence

Ramses Fernandez

For the last two years, classical structural attacks on McEliece with binary Goppa codes progressed further, at the parameters of Classic McEliece, than in the previous…For the last two years, classical structural attacks on McEliece with binary Goppa codes progressed further, at the parameters of Classic McEliece, than in the previous four decades: a subexponential and then a quasi-polynomial…

Preprint: empirical study
arXiv

Not Where You Think: Protecting Location Privacy Against Reasoning-Based Geolocation

Shanghao Shi, Jian Xiao, Hao Li et al.

Recent large reasoning models can infer where ordinary photos were taken using only visual information, creating a serious location privacy risk even when metadata and…Recent large reasoning models can infer where ordinary photos were taken using only visual information, creating a serious location privacy risk even when metadata and obvious geographic identifiers are removed.

Preprint: method
arXiv

Agent Mosaic: Recognizing Confidentiality Leaks in Agentic LLM Systems

Daniel Ruiz, Luca Luceri, Emilio Ferrara

Modern LLM agents can retrieve information from accessible documents, and then disclose a sensitive conclusion assembled from them.Modern LLM agents can retrieve information from accessible documents, and then disclose a sensitive conclusion assembled from them. This mosaic effect creates a critical risk for agents operating over confidential data.

Preprint: empirical study
arXiv

Disclosure Begets Disclosure: A Self-Reinforcing Privacy Loop in LLM Agents with Persistent Memory

Masahiro Kaneko, Hiromi Arai, Timothy Baldwin

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly use persistent memory to personalize responses, and personal attributes in this memory pose a privacy risk if exposed.Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly use persistent memory to personalize responses, and personal attributes in this memory pose a privacy risk if exposed.

Preprint: empirical study

Thu, Oct 224 papers

arXiv

Characterizing and Defending Utility-Hijacking in Instruction-Tuning Data Selection

Yahao Ren, Jian Lou, Huadi Zheng et al.

Instruction-data selectors choose which instruction-following records are used for fine-tuning, improving alignment quality, raising training efficiency, and filtering…Instruction-data selectors choose which instruction-following records are used for fine-tuning, improving alignment quality, raising training efficiency, and filtering out harmful records.

Preprint: method
arXiv

Memory summaries let attackers forge commands in coding agents

Forged approvals entered an agent's memory 87-100% of the time across five flattening systems, against 0% across four systems that keep message roles separate.Forged approvals entered an agent's memory 87-100% of the time across five flattening systems, against 0% across four systems that keep message roles separate.

Layered blue conversation sheets keep a black strip outside, beside a compressed gray stack with a black strip embedded among scattered fragments.
Preprint: empirical study
arXiv

Correlated Failures of AI Approval Monitors

Luca Zanolini

Before an AI agent takes a consequential action, such as paying, messaging or changing code, several monitors check it.Before an AI agent takes a consequential action, such as paying, messaging or changing code, several monitors check it. Their verdicts are combined by aggregating scores or by counting approvals, whatever inputs the monitors…

Preprint: empirical study
arXiv

Combining Long-Term Memory and LLMs Comes at a High Cost: From Prompt Injection to Persistent Compromise

Pedro H. Barcha Correia, Matheus Azevedo de Sá, Paulo H. Gomes de Senna et al.

The widespread adoption of generative artificial intelligence in recent years has brought a parallel rise in prompt injection and jailbreak attacks.The widespread adoption of generative artificial intelligence in recent years has brought a parallel rise in prompt injection and jailbreak attacks.

Preprint: empirical study

Wed, Oct 21

arXiv

After the Attacker Leaves: Benchmarking Carryover Attacks on LLM Agents

Zhiyue Xu, Xukai Wang, Zhiyuan Huang et al.

Modern LLM agents persist state across sessions via two channels: long-lived memory files silently prepended to the system prompt, and scheduled tasks waking the agent…Modern LLM agents persist state across sessions via two channels: long-lived memory files silently prepended to the system prompt, and scheduled tasks waking the agent without user input.

Preprint: benchmark or dataset
arXiv

Popular watermarks for language models can be reliably defeated

A unified attack method cut detection rates across seven watermarking schemes to at most 0.05 across all settings tested while preserving text quality.A unified attack method cut detection rates across seven watermarking schemes to at most 0.05 across all settings tested while preserving text quality.

A large blue document holds intact blocks beside a smaller gray sheet with perforated blocks under an inspection ring, with a black curve alongside.
Preprint: method
arXiv

Checking each action cannot stop safety failures in AI agents

A mathematical proof shows that safety guards inspecting individual actions without false alarms cannot detect violations that emerge only by comparing separate runs.A mathematical proof shows that safety guards inspecting individual actions without false alarms cannot detect violations that emerge only by comparing separate runs.

A light blue enclosure holds separated dark pieces beside a tray of loose shapes and a cradle where joined shapes reveal a dark split.
Preprint: theory
arXiv

When Pebbles Are Not Atomic: A Polynomial Separation Between Pure and Entangled Pebbling

Piotr Marszalik

Graph pebbling is the model in which the memory cost of memory-hard functions and proofs of space is measured, and pebbling lower bounds are the main way to argue that…Graph pebbling is the model in which the memory cost of memory-hard functions and proofs of space is measured, and pebbling lower bounds are the main way to argue that such constructions are secure.

Preprint: theory